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Powerful players: how constituents captured the 
setting of IFRS 6, an accounting standard for the 
extractive industries 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper illustrates the influence of powerful players in the setting of 
IFRS 6, a new International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) for 
the extractive industries.  A critical investigative inquiry of the 
international accounting standard setting process, using Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA), reveals some of the key players, analyses 
the surrounding discourse and its implications, and assesses the 
outcomes.  An analysis of small cross-section of comment letters 
submitted to the International Accounting Standards Committee 
(IASC) by one international accounting firm, one global mining 
corporation and one industry group reveal the hidden coalitions 
between powerful players.  These coalitions indicate that the 
regulatory process of setting IFRS 6 has been captured by powerful 
extractive industries constituents so that it merely codifies existing 
industry practice.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The extractive industries are a powerful force in global political and economic 
relations.  With this sector including oil, gas, and mining companies such as Exxon 
Mobil, BHP Billiton, Anglo American, and the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, the 
extractive industries are significant at both national and international levels.  In 2005, 
the world’s top twenty extractive industries companies recorded profits in excess of 
US$211 trillion (Fortune Magazine, 2006).  Comparing this to the United States’ 2005 
Gross Domestic Product of US$11 trillion gives some idea of the enormity of this 
sector.  When investigating an industry of this stature, it is appropriate to scrutinise 
the reporting practices adopted by entities to disclose financial information.  As such, 
the accounting standards which guide the preparation of financial reports must also be 
considered.  The most recent efforts to regulate extractive industry accounting were 
proposed by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), now the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB).1  In 1998 when the IASC initiated 
the extractive industries project, its aim was to address the divergent accounting 
practices used by companies operating in the sector.  By 2004 when the IASB finally 
released IFRS 6, Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources, the standard 
did little to regularise varied accounting practice and instead codified existing 
industry practice enabling companies to continue reporting in their preferred mode. 
 
To make sense what was essentially inaction by the IASB, the publically available 
discourse put forward during the process of setting the extractive industries standard 
                                                 
1 The IASC was restructured from the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), which 
became operational in 2001. Throughout this paper both bodies will be referred to since the 
Extractive Industries project was initiated by the IASC and carried forward by the IASB.   
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was analysed using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).  The outcome, IFRS 6, is 
framed in terms of regulatory capture to suggest that the IASB was captured by the 
very constituents it was supposed to regulate.  This paper presents some of that 
analysis, focussing on a cross section of key players: Exxon Mobil, a major extractive 
industries company, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), the audit firm for Exxon Mobil, 
and the American Petroleum Institute, a lobby group for the oil and gas industry of 
which Exxon Mobil is a member.   
 
The paper is organised as follows.  The background details relating to extractive 
industries accounting and the methods of accounting for pre-production activities is 
first presented.  This is followed by a description of the methodological approach 
based on regulatory capture theory and facilitated by CDA.  Empirical analysis of 
publically available discourse provides evidence of the lobbying efforts of the key 
players, and conclusions are drawn on the basis of understanding the outcome of the 
international accounting standard setting process for the extractive industries as an 
example of regulatory capture. 
2. Background 
 
Many companies engaged in the extractive industries are high profile, economically 
important, and have operations that span the globe.  A diversity of approaches to 
accounting for and reporting the results of extractive operations has evolved in the 
world’s major mining regions of Australia, Canada, South Africa, the United 
Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US).  As the extractive industries continued to 
become increasingly important globally, the IASC recognised that there was a need 
for an international accounting standard that would provide investors and other users 
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with relevant, reliable, and comparable financial information (International 
Accounting Standards Committee, 2000; International Accounting Standards Board, 
2004).   
 
In response to this perceived need, in 1998 the IASC added to its agenda an extractive 
industries project aimed at identifying and addressing the measurement and disclosure 
issues faced by the extractive industries.  Among the many issues under consideration, 
a particular concern related to the methods used to account for pre-production costs 
by extractive industries entities.  Pre-production costs are those incurred as a result of 
activities undertaken to explore the existence of mineral reserves and evaluate their 
commercial viability.  These pre-production costs, also referred to as exploration and 
evaluation costs, can run into the hundreds of millions of dollars, and for some 
smaller exploration companies can be a substantial drain on resources in the search 
for oil or minerals.  Over time, two main methods of accounting for pre-production 
costs have developed: the successful efforts method and the full cost method (Pratt, 
1990; International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000; Bryant, 2003).2   
 
The important difference between these methods is the amount of pre-production cost 
capitalised under each method.  Under successful efforts accounting, pre-production 
costs can only remain capitalised if they relate to the successful discovery and 
development of a mineral reserve (Flory and Grossman, 1978; International 
Accounting Standards Committee, 2000).  In the pre-production stage, all costs may 
be capitalised but if an exploration project proves to be unsuccessful, these costs must 
be written off.  If the project is successful, then the capitalised costs are amortised 
                                                 
2 Variations of these two main methods have developed over time, however it is these two methods 
that are the focus of this research.   
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against the revenue earned from the project (Flory and Grossman, 1978; Amernic, 
1979; Frazier and Ingersoll, 1986; International Accounting Standards Committee, 
2000).  The successful efforts method is arguably consistent with accounting 
principles of matching and conservatism, however the inherent uncertainty associated 
with exploration activities means that the income streams and asset balances of 
entities reporting under the successful efforts method can fluctuate significantly 
(Editorial, 1986; Frazier and Ingersoll, 1986).  While this does not present much of a 
problem for large enterprises that can afford to absorb losses from unsuccessful 
ventures, it can be a significant issue for smaller companies and they have tended to 
avoid successful efforts accounting (Editorial, 1986; Frazier and Ingersoll, 1986). 
 
In contrast, the full cost method is much more popular with smaller exploration 
companies.  Under full cost accounting, all pre-production costs regardless of whether 
they relate to a successful or unsuccessful project may be capitalised as an asset 
(Flory and Grossman, 1978; Amernic, 1979; Frazier and Ingersoll, 1986; International 
Accounting Standards Committee, 2000).  The pre-production costs are carried 
forward indefinitely and then matched against revenue derived from successful 
ventures.  Because there is no requirement to expense unsuccessful projects under the 
full cost method, an income smoothing effect results (Flory and Grossman, 1978; 
Ingersoll, 1986; International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000).  For smaller 
companies with limited sources of finance, strict debt covenants, and aggressive 
exploration programs, the full cost method represents an opportunity to expand and 
develop (Flory and Grossman, 1978; Amernic, 1979; Frazier and Ingersoll, 1986; 
Ingersoll, 1986; Johnson and Ramanan, 1988; Van Riper, 1994; Jeter, 2001).   
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The impact of each of these methods on reported profits can be substantial.  For 
example, Premier Oil, an oil producer based in the United Kingdom, restated its 
profits in 2004 in preparation for the transition to IFRS (Neveling, 2005).  Reporting 
under the full cost method, the company posted a $44 million profit.  However, after 
switching to the successful efforts method, the result was a downward restatement of 
profits to $22 million (Neveling, 2005).  It was this type of reporting disparity that 
prompted the IASC to address these reporting practices at an international level when 
it embarked on its extractive industries project in 1998 (International Accounting 
Standards Committee, 2000; 2000; Wise and Spear, 2000; Micallef, 2001; Rabee, 
2003).  However, this is not the first time standard setters have sought to address the 
successful efforts versus full cost accounting issue. 
 
The controversy over successful efforts versus full cost accounting first erupted in the 
1970s and centred pre-dominantly in the US.  In response to the 1973 world oil crisis, 
the US government enacted the Energy Policy and Conservation Act in 1975, which 
stipulated that standardised accounting practices for the extractive industries be 
established (Katz, 1985; Cortese et al., 2008).  In 1997, the US Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) in charge of the standardisation proposed that the successful 
efforts method be mandated as the single method of accounting for oil and gas pre-
production costs (Flory and Grossman, 1978; Van Riper, 1994; Cortese et al., 2008).  
In the deliberations that followed, proponents of the full cost method argued 
vigorously for the retention of both the full cost and successful methods, stressing the 
importance of the full cost method to the continuation and growth of US oil and gas 
exploration companies (Van Riper, 1994).  The Ad Hoc Committee on Full Costing 
was formed by industry constituents, congressional leaders were targeted by 
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companies and lobby groups, and many on the receiving end commented that they had 
“never seen such aggressive lobbying in their Washington careers” (Gorton, 1991, 
p.30 cited in Van Riper, 1994, p.64).  The eventual outcome of all this was a win to 
the lobbyists.  The FASB proposals were rejected by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and instead a standard was issued that required extensive disclosures 
about oil and gas producing activities without actually mandating a particular method 
for disclosure (Katz, 1985; Van Riper, 1994).3   
 
A multitude of investigations into accounting for the extractive industries emerged 
following the FASB’s proposal to eliminate the full cost method of accounting for 
pre-production activities and require entities to report under the successful efforts 
method.  Numerous studies have examined, for example, the market effects of the 
proposed change in accounting method (Baker, 1976; Amernic, 1979; Collins and 
Dent, 1979; Dyckman, 1979; Dyckman and Smith, 1979; Lawrie, 1986).  Other 
studies have investigated the relationship between accounting method choice (full cost 
or successful efforts) and company characteristics such as size, age, exploration 
aggressiveness, exploration success, demand for capital, and debt to equity ratio 
(Deakin, 1979; Lilien and Pastena, 1981).  Other strands of research on the topic have 
attempted to predict reasons for switching between accounting methods (Johnson and 
Ramanan, 1988; Nichols, 1993), and have studied the relationship between successful 
efforts and full cost data and company share price (Bandyopadhyay, 1994; Berry et 
al., 2003; Bryant, 2003; Al Jabr and Spear, 2004).   
 
                                                 
3 For a more detailed discussion of the history of the successful efforts versus full cost controversy see 
(Cortese et al., 2008). 
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Given that attempts to standardise accounting methods were unsuccessful in the US in 
the 1970s and that the IASB has also been unable to implement uniformity, there is a 
need to understand why this is the case rather than simply analysing the market effects 
of the different methods.  To redress this imbalance in the literature, this paper applies 
a critical investigative lens to the international accounting standard setting process.  It 
examines the due process of the IASC/IASB, the key players contributing to it, and 
evaluates the outcome, IFRS 6.  It seeks to uncover the political connections and 
powerful coalitions that influence the process and shape its outcomes.  Because this 
project is industry-specific, it provides a unique opportunity to study constituents that 
have common social, political, and economic interests.  Critical Discourse Analysis 
provides a method to explore the standard setting process.  Regulatory capture theory 
provides a lens through which to understand and interpret it.  
3. Methodological approach: regulatory capture and 
CDA 
 
CDA positions the international accounting standard setting process in its social, 
political, and economic contexts and reveals the relationship between the IASC/IASB 
and extractive industries constituents.  Central to CDA is the understanding that 
language (written or spoken) is integral to social life and fundamental to political 
negotiations at a number of levels.  Fairclough (1993, 1995, 2003) identified three 
levels that must be considered in critical analyses of discourse:  
(e)ach discursive event has three dimensions or facets: it is a spoken or 
written language text, it is an instance of discourse practice involving the 
production and interpretation of text, and it is a piece of social practice 
(emphasis in original) (Fairclough, 1993, p.136).  
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Thus, each discursive event is comprised of three levels, while a simultaneous 
relationship exists between each level.  It is the identification of linkages between 
these three levels that enables the relationship between “discourse, power, dominance 
and social inequality” (Van Dijk, 1993, p.249) to be discerned and illuminated 
(Fairclough, 2003).  By examining the text, or public discourse and the social 
structure within which the text is put forward (social practice), it is possible to expose 
the discourse practice as an “interactive process of meaning-making” (Fairclough, 
2003, p.10) that occurs as public discourse is produced, received, and interpreted.  
 
As part of the standard setting process, the Extractive Industries Issues Paper 
(hereafter the Issues Paper) was published in November 2000, and comments were 
invited from interested parties concerning the issues raised (International Accounting 
Standards Committee, 2000).  In response, comment letters were received from a 
variety of constituents including mining and petroleum companies, extractive 
industries lobby groups, and international accounting firms.  At face value, these 
responses appeared fairly innocuous.  However, by examining these responses and 
respondents through a critical investigative lens, in the vein of Sikka and colleagues 
(Sikka et al., 1989; Sikka, 1992; Mitchell and Sikka, 1993; see for example Mitchell 
et al., 1994; Sikka and Willmott, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1998; 2001), a number of 
overlapping interests among the respondents themselves, and between the respondents 
and the IASC/IASB, were revealed.  It became evident that there was potential for 
powerful players to influence the international accounting standard setting process.  
CDA was used to examine these publicly available responses.  CDA explicitly 
positions this discourse in the context of the social practices and institutional 
arrangements of the IASC/IASB.  The international accounting standard setting 
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process is viewed as an “interactive process of meaning making” (Fairclough, 2003, 
p.10) through which discourse is used to exert “power, dominance, and social 
inequality” (Van Dijk, 1993, p.249).  In other words, CDA provides a framework 
through which to study documents, websites, and other archival data, and seek 
connections between these data.  It facilitates understanding of a particular process or 
event rather than just looking for information for its own sake.  By providing a 
framework that specifically searches for connecting relationships between key players 
in the standard setting process, the potential for regulatory capture to be exposed is far 
greater than if, for example, a content analysis based method of reviewing comment 
letters was used.   
 
To facilitate an understanding of the standard setting process following analysis of 
discourse, regulatory capture theory is adopted as a theoretical lens.  Regulatory 
capture explains the predisposition of regulated industries, such as the extractive 
industries, to capture the regulatory body, in this case the IASC/IASB (Mitnick, 1980; 
Walker, 1987).  Regulatory capture theory was derived from economic theories of 
regulation, which sought to explain the pattern of regulation by governments (Posner, 
1974).  Developed by “an odd mixture of welfare state liberals, muckrakers, Marxists, 
and free market economists”, regulatory capture theory was used to argue that 
regulation was supplied in response to the demands of particular interest groups 
(Posner, 1974, ,p.335).  Mitnick’s (1980) conception of regulatory capture focused 
specifically on the relationship between regulatory bodies and the industries they were 
intended to regulate.  It considered how aspects of this relationship can promote 
capture and result in the regulatory body making decisions and taking actions 
consistent with the preferences of the regulated industry (Mitnick, 1980).   
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Very few accounting studies have examined accounting regulation from this 
perspective.  A notable exception is a study by Walker (1987), a former member of 
the Accounting Standards Review Board (ARSB) in Australia, who provided a 
personal account of the Australian accounting standard setting process.4  Walker 
(1987) used Mitnick’s (1980) theory of regulatory capture to argue that the accounting 
standard setting process in Australia had been captured by the interest groups it was 
established to regulate.  In developing his argument, Walker (1987) traced the early 
history of the ASRB and noted the lobbying power of the accountancy bodies in the 
early stages of the ASRB’s formation, which ensured that the ASRB would not have 
independent research capabilities.  He also argued that the profession had “managed 
to influence the procedures, priorities, and output of the Board”, and further, that it 
had influenced appointments to the Board so that “virtually all members of the Board 
might reasonably be expected to have some community of interests with the 
profession” (Walker, 1987, p.282).  Having provided a convincing argument for the 
regulatory capture of the ASRB, Walker (1987) concluded by stressing the 
importance of highlighting the process of accounting standard setting and examining 
the political arrangements surrounding the process.   
 
Walker’s (1987) account was an insider’s view of regulatory capture taking place.  
Not being privy to the inner workings of the IASC/IASB, this inquiry provides a 
bird’s eye view of the extractive industries project.  The development of the project is 
traced from its placement on the IASC agenda, to the formation of the Steering 
Committee, to the development of the Issues Paper, the calling for responses, the 
                                                 
4 The Accounting Standards Review Board was replaced by the Australian Accounting Standards 
Board (AASB) in 1991. 
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resulting comment letters, and the eventual production of the accounting standard.  A 
summary of how CDA and regulatory capture are used to understand the standard 
setting process is presented in Figure 1. 
(Take in Figure 1) 
As shown in Figure 1, the first stage of CDA involves collating the public discourse.  
In other words, this stage involves finding out who is having a say in the standard 
setting process and determining what they are saying.  In this analysis, the comment 
letters submitted in response to the Issues Paper comprise the public discourse. 
Comment letters were received by 52 respondents, many of them powerful extractive 
industries companies, lobby groups, and international accounting firms.  Within the 
context of the IASC/IASB’s due process, this public discourse is put forward by 
interested parties in order to influence a favourable outcome.  This context forms the 
social practice element of CDA portrayed in Figure 1. 
 
The social practice element of CDA provides a context within which to view the 
public discourse.  The international accounting standard process takes place within the 
context of the IASC/IASB’s established due process procedures and funding 
arrangements and outcomes are influenced by them.  Further, that this particular 
standard, IFRS 6, is an industry specific standard, the presence and influence of the 
extractive industries must also be considered part of the institutional framework.  By 
interpreting the public discourse in the context of social practice structures, 
connections can be made, forming the discourse practice element of CDA. 
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At the discourse practice level, it is important that public discourse and social practice 
be considered concurrently so that connections can be uncovered and explored.  To do 
this, the relationships between extractive industries constituents and the IASC/IASB 
are examined closely to reveal linkages which might influence the outcome of the 
standard setting process.  Thus, discourse practice makes connections between the 
public discourse and the social practice to show how meanings are created and 
controlled.  CDA thereby enables this discourse practice to be exposed and analysed, 
rather than remaining hidden and taken-for-granted.  As noted, from a wider 
examination of the discourse practice surrounding the standard setting process, a case 
study is presented that examines the linkages between Exxon Mobil, PwC, the API, 
and the IASC/IASB.   
4. Social practice: The IASC/IASB 
 
Significant in understanding the context in which international accounting standard 
setting operates is a consideration of the IASC/IASB’s funding arrangements and dur 
process.  Prior to the IASC’s restructure in 2001, its revenue came from three main 
sources: fees paid by Board members and by the International Federation of 
Accountants, profits made on IASC publications, and voluntary contributions from 
companies and other organisations with an interest in the work of the IASC 
(International Accounting Standards Committee, 1999).  The major international 
accounting firms have been providing monetary support to the IASC since the 
external funding initiative was launched in 1990 and have always been its major 
source of funding (International Accounting Standards Committee, 1993).  As part of 
the restructure, the IASC Foundation was formed as a not-for-profit entity, and it was 
envisaged that the IASB would be supported primarily by private contributions of 
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chartered accounting firms and business enterprises internationally (International 
Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, 2001).   
 
Brown (2006, p.86) noted the irony of the not-for-profit status of the IASC 
Foundation when it is, in fact, closely tied to “big business” through its funding 
scheme.  He argued that the IASC/IASB’s funding arrangements set up a dependency 
relationship between the IASC/IASB and its benefactors which may result in the 
marginalisation of critical issues, such as environmental and social accounting, in 
favour of issues that align with the political and economic interests of the supporters 
(Brown and Shardlow, 2005; Brown, 2006).  With the IASC Foundation receiving 
contributions totalling over US$16,000,000 from 283 corporations, associations, and 
other institutions, including a number of the world’s leading multinational 
corporations in 2006  (International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, 
2003), the ability of the IASC/IASB to “unlock itself from the patronage and 
dependency of its large funders” is indeed questionable (Brown, 2006, p.88).  Table 1 
shows a list of all respondents to the Issues Paper and indicates which of these 
respondents also provides financial support to the IASC/IASB.5   
(Take in Table 1) 
The institutional arrangements that support the setting of international financial 
reporting standards also involve a “due process” (International Accounting Standards 
Committee, 1993).  During this consultative stage, the views of “experts from the 
accounting profession, users of financial statements, business community, and 
national standard setting bodies” are sought (International Accounting Standards 
                                                 
5 An excerpt from the IASB’s 2006 annual report, which lists its financial supporters for that year, is 
presented in Appendix 1. 
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Committee, 1993, p.1).6  To lead the due process for the extractive industries project, 
the IASC established a Steering Committee, which was claimed to be internationally 
representative.  Consistent with the composition of the IASB itself, and other Boards 
and Committees of the IASB (Brown, 2004), the Steering Committee members were 
drawn almost exclusively from international accounting firms, and large multinational 
corporations from Australia, the United Kingdom, the US, and Canada.  There was no 
representation from other extractive industries stakeholder groups such as developing 
countries, environmental groups, and human resources groups (International 
Accounting Standards Committee, 2000; Brown, 2006). 
 
The Steering Committee led the development of the Extractive Industries Issues 
Paper, published in November 2000.  The Issues Paper was a 412-page document 
consisting of 16 chapters which raised a number of “Basic Issues” and “Sub-Issues” 
concerning matters such as reserve estimation and valuation, recognition and 
measurement of inventories, and financial statement disclosures.  To guide 
commentators, the Issues Paper also set out the Steering Committee’s “tentative 
views” on some of the issues considered most significant (International Accounting 
Standards Committee, 2000).  Interested parties were invited to comment on their 
preferred method for accounting for pre-production costs.  The Steering Committee’s 
tentative view indicated its preference for the successful efforts method of accounting 
for pre-production activities and suggested that only one method should be permitted 
in the IFRS for the extractive industries.  Therefore, in effect, the Steering Committee 
                                                 
6 A critique of the social discourse of this “due process”, while worthy of further study, is beyond 
the scope of this paper.  Mouck (2004) explores the subjective social construction of a financial 
reporting regulatory framework, which he described as the “rules of the game”.  
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was attempting to eliminate the use of the full cost method and require all extractive 
industries enterprises to report under the successful efforts method.  . 
 
The comment letters submitted to the IASC/IASB comprise the public discourse and 
focal point for the critical analysis of the international accounting standard setting 
process.  Although the IASC distributed the Issues Paper to almost 300 companies 
worldwide, only 52 comment letters were received.  These were from respondents in 
Australia, Canada, China, Germany, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the US. 
The respondents included mining companies, petroleum companies, extractive 
industries lobby groups, international accounting firms, professional accounting 
bodies, standard setting bodies, and academics.   
 
Over seventy percent of respondents to the Issues Paper commented on the successful 
efforts versus full cost issue, with the vast majority supporting elimination of the full 
cost method of accounting for pre-production costs.  However, a closer analysis of 
respondents supporting the elimination of full cost accounting showed that the 
majority of proponents were large extractive industries enterprises that were already 
using the successful efforts method of accounting or international accounting firms, 
which have these same large enterprises as clients.  The respondents arguing against 
the cessation of the full cost method were smaller exploration companies and lobby 
groups that represented the interests of these smaller companies as well as large 
extractive industries enterprises.  Thus, these lobby groups, most notably the 
American Petroleum Institute and the UK Oil Industry Accounting Committee, 
represent a powerful coalition of extractive industries entities. 
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Having situated the public discourse (comment letters) within the social context of the 
international accounting standard setting process for the extractive industries, the 
discourse practice must be considered to determine how the discourse was produced 
by respondents (that is, by whom the discourse was created and what it contained), 
and how it was received, and interpreted by the IASC/IASB.  Given the large volume 
of comment letters available for analysis, to illustrate the connections among 
respondents, and between the respondents and the IASC/IASB, as noted, a small cross 
section of respondents was selected: Exxon Mobil Corporation, PwC, and the API.  In 
the following sections, the overlapping interests of these extractive industries players 
are revealed to gain a richer understanding of the discourse practice that contributed 
to the standard setting process. 
5. Public Discourse: The Key Players 
5.1 PricewaterhouseCoopers  
 
PwC is the largest of the “Big 4” international accounting firms, providing auditing 
and assurance, crisis management, human resource management, tax, and advisory 
services to its clients.  Recording gross revenues of US$20.3 billion in 2005, PwC’s 
client list includes 84% of the companies in the Fortune Global 500 index 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005).  One of these clients is the Exxon Mobil Group, for 
which PwC is the external auditor. 
 
PwC provided two responses in respect of the Issues Paper, one from its South 
African branch and another from its Australian office.  In response to the full cost 
versus successful efforts issue, PwC Australia supported the tentative views of the 
Steering Committee, indicating that it would prefer a method consistent with the 
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successful efforts method and that only one method should be allowed.  However, 
PwC Australia also cautioned the IASC against using “established terms” such as full 
cost and successful efforts because of the variety of different meanings and hybrid 
approaches that have evolved.  They stated that “their continued use may only serve 
to perpetuate existing differences in thinking and practical application” 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers South Africa, 2001).  While PwC South Africa supported 
the views of the Steering Committee, it noted that “special consideration” should be 
given to junior companies, allowing them to carry forward costs pending 
determination of commercially recoverable reserves (PricewaterhouseCoopers South 
Africa, 2001). 
 
These Big 4 accounting firms have traditionally provided important resources to the 
IASC/IASB in the form of finance (see Table 1), personnel, technical expertise, and 
members for many of the IASC/IASB’s committees.  Indeed PwC was represented on 
the Steering Committee established to direct the extractive industries project and 
formulate and publish the Issues Paper.  As well as providing direct support, these 
international accounting firms serve an important liaison function between the 
IASC/IASB and their clients.  Evidence of the interaction between chartered firms 
and their clients with respect to IASC/IASB issues can be found in the opening 
paragraphs of the comment letter submitted by PwC South Africa, in which the firm 
stated that “in preparing this response we have sought input from members of our 
South African firm” (PricewaterhouseCoopers South Africa, 2001, p.1).  In addition, 
Georgiou (2004) provided evidence that a considerable number of companies lobby 
the IASB through their external auditor thus requiring extensive consultation between 
 20
auditor and client in order to ensure that client interests are accurately represented.  
An important client of PwC is the Exxon Mobil Corporation.   
5.2 The Exxon Mobil Corporation 
 
The Exxon Mobil Corporation is a US-based petroleum and petrochemical company, 
with operations that span more than 200 countries across 6 continents.  The company 
is involved in exploration, production, refining, and marketing of oil, gas, and 
petrochemical products (Exxon Mobil Corporation, 2005).  Exxon Mobil’s most 
recent financial highlights include total revenue of US$298 billion, net income of 
US$25.3 billion, total assets of US$195 billion, and a market valuation of US$300 
billion (Exxon Mobil Corporation, 2005).  In 2004, Exxon Mobil’s financial statement 
were audited by PwC, which received US$47.5 million from the company for the 
provision of audit, advisory, and taxation services (ExxonMobil Corporation, 2005).  
The auditor/client relationship of PwC and Exxon Mobil, the personnel and financial 
connections between IASC/IASB and PwC, and the financial donations made to the 
IASC/IASB by Exxon Mobil and its subsidiary Esso Imperial Oil, create a complex 
web of interconnectedness between these players. 
 
The Exxon Mobil Group submitted two almost identical comment letters: one from 
Exxon Mobil Corporation itself, and one from its Canadian subsidiary, Esso Imperial 
Oil.  Both comment letters indicated support for the successful efforts method, not 
surprising given that both entities reported under the successful efforts method and 
have adequate resources to absorb losses that may be incurred from unsuccessful 
exploration efforts (Esso Imperial Oil, 2004; ExxonMobil Corporation, 2005).  
However, also stressed in both comment letters was overriding preference for US 
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Financial Accounting Standard 19 (FAS 19).  An excerpt from Esso’s comment letter 
follows: 
“In general our responses to the IASC issues are based on the view that 
U.S. Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 19 should be the 
definitive accounting standard for oil and gas company accounting and 
disclosures” (Esso Imperial Oil, 2001). 
 
Interestingly, this US accounting standard was the key driver of the successful efforts 
versus full cost controversy during the 1970s.  FAS 19 proposed to prohibit the use of 
the full cost method and required all US oil and gas companies to use the successful 
efforts method to account for pre-production costs.  This was the same standard that 
was eventually rejected by the Securities and Exchange Commission, but it was 
amended in FAS 25 to allow companies to use either the full cost or successful efforts 
methods for reporting purposes (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 2005).  So, 
although ostensibly agreeing with the IASC’s proposal, the most acceptable outcome 
for this powerful extractive industries group would be an approach consistent with US 
GAAP, which allows substantially more flexibility than that proposed in the Issues 
Paper.   
 
As indicated above and shown in Table 1, the Exxon Mobil Group has a direct 
financial relationship with the IASB.  The Group has been a “supporter” of the IASB 
since 2001, providing an annual but undisclosed sum of money to help fund the 
activities of the IASB.  Exxon Mobil and its subsidiary companies are also affiliated 
with a number of industry bodies including the International Association of Oil and 
Gas Producers, the API, the US National Petroleum Council, the US Energy 
Association, the UK Petroleum Industry Association, the Australian Institute of 
Petroleum, and the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers.  Of these industry 
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lobby groups, the API submitted a comment letter in response to the Issues Paper on 
behalf of its members.   
5.3 The American Petroleum Institute 
 
The API, a North American-based industry lobby group, represents over 400 
members involved in all aspects of the oil and gas industry (American Petroleum 
Institute, 2005).  Both Exxon Mobil and Esso Imperial Oil are members of the API.  
The mission of the API is to “influence public policy in support of a strong, viable 
U.S. oil and natural gas industry” (American Petroleum Institute, 2005).  To that end, 
the API engages in legislative and regulatory advocacy and provides a forum within 
which members can collaborate to develop consensus on policy matters such as those 
contained in the IASC’s Issues Paper (American Petroleum Institute, 2005).   
 
Many of the API member companies have provided financial assistance to the 
IASC/IASB as either underwriters or supporters and/or also responded to the Issues 
Paper, including BP, the BHP Billiton, ConocoPhillips, Exxon Mobil, Kerr-McGee, 
the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, and Total.  While the API’s representation of such large 
multinational corporations is important, individually, these entities already have a 
voice: they have the resources, inclination, and ability to participate in policy making 
decisions, such as the setting of an international accounting standard for the extractive 
industries.  The value of the API, and coalitions like it, is that it is able to present 
these individual views in a collective and unified manner and also to provide an 
opportunity for smaller entities to have their interests represented on issues from 
which they would otherwise be excluded.  While the API’s full member list is not 
publicly available, of the 250 members that are listed, the vast majority are junior 
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exploration companies or relatively small industry service providers that are unlikely 
to possess the expertise or resources to participate in high level accounting standard 
setting policy deliberations.  Further, by allowing their views to be represented by an 
industry coalition such as the API, individual extractive industries companies may 
avoid making controversial public statements about the IASC/IASB’s proposals, 
while still being able indirectly to participate and influence the setting of the 
accounting standard.   
 
The API, in its comment letter, indicated its support for policies and practices 
consistent with US GAAP, and specifically for the provisions of FAS 19 which, as 
discussed, provide significantly more accounting flexibility than the proposed 
international accounting standard (American Petroleum Institute, 2001).  The API 
stressed the importance of providing the industry the “flexibility” of both the full cost 
and successful efforts approaches to accounting and allowing entities to choose the 
method most suitable for financial reporting: 
The U.S. oil and gas industry has accounted for its operations in accordance 
with Financial Accounting Statement (FAS) 19, Financial Accounting and 
Reporting by Oil and Gas Producing Companies for almost 25 years. [FAS 
19] has provided the flexibility to account for the petroleum industry under 
either a successful efforts concept or a full cost concept.  We support the 
practice of allowing an enterprise to choose among the successful efforts and 
full cost accounting models in the primary financial statements (American 
Petroleum Institute, 2001, p.2). 
 
 
The API acknowledged the controversial nature of this position but argued that 
comparability of results between successful efforts and full cost entities had not 
proved to be a problem for the US because of disclosure requirements that allowed 
users to differentiate between the two methods (American Petroleum Institute, 2001).   
The API’s position on this issue is consistent with the history of US controversy over 
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the full cost versus successful efforts methods of accounting.  Given the outcomes of 
the IASC/IASB’s extractive industries project, discussed in the next section, it 
appears that an industry lobby group is an effective vehicle for participation and 
influence over international standard setting processes.    
5. IFRS 6: a “new” standard for the extractive 
industries? 
 
The Steering Committee’s tentative view on the full cost versus successful efforts 
issue was that only the successful efforts accounting method should be available for 
use by extractive industries entities.  In other words, the IASC was attempting to 
eliminate the use of the full cost method of accounting for extractive activities and 
require entities to report under the successful efforts method.  PwC agreed with the 
broad position of the Steering Committee although, as already noted, its South 
African branch suggested that special consideration should be given to junior entities.  
Exxon Mobil, and its subsidiary Esso Imperial Oil, of which PwC was the auditor, 
also endorsed the views of the Steering Committee.  However, it indicated an over-
riding preference for an approach consistent with FAS 19, which offered considerably 
more flexibility than that proposed in the Issues Paper.  The API directly opposed the 
views of the Steering Committee, arguing that preserving existing practices and 
allowing companies the flexibility of both the successful efforts and full cost methods 
was important to the extractive industries. 
 
The Steering Committee intended to review the public responses to the Issues Paper 
and, on the basis of these, develop an Exposure Draft which would also be published 
for public comment (International Accounting Standards Committee, 2000).  The 
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comments received in respect of the Exposure Draft would be reviewed, after which a 
final standard would be produced for consideration by the restructured IASC Board.  
However, at the time the Issues Paper was published, the IASC was in the midst of 
restructuring.  As a consequence, the IASC’s plans for the development of the 
extractive industries project came with the caveat that “the restructured IASC Board 
will have to decide its own agenda and priorities” (International Accounting 
Standards Committee, 2000, p.5).  Indeed it did.   
 
In July 2001, the IASB announced that it would restart the project only when agenda 
time permitted (International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, 2003; 
2004).  Then in September 2002, it was decided that it was not feasible to complete a 
comprehensive project in time for adoption by entities in 2005.  Instead, on 15 
January 2004, Exposure Draft 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources 
(ED 6) was issued in lieu of a comprehensive international accounting standard for 
the extractive industries (International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, 
2004).   
 
The exposure draft intended to make limited improvements to accounting practices 
for exploration and evaluation expenditures without requiring major changes that may 
need to be revised once a comprehensive review of the accounting practices of 
extractive industries entities was made (Heaphy, 2004; International Accounting 
Standards Committee Foundation, 2004).  In other words, ED 6 proposed that entities 
be permitted to continue with their most recent accounting policies, which could be 
the full cost or successful efforts method, until the completion of a comprehensive 
review.  Unsurprisingly, there was little opposition to these proposals and the 
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provisions of ED 6 were eventually incorporated into IFRS 6, issued on 9 December 
2004 (International Accounting Standards Board, 2004).  It appears that the time 
frame for continued use of existing accounting policies is unspecified at this stage, 
with no comprehensive review initiated or development of the extractive industries 
project since IFRS 6 was issued (International Accounting Standards Board, 2005).   
 
Viewing this outcome through the lens of regulatory capture theory, it appears that the 
extractive industries have captured the international accounting standard setting 
processes in order to secure favourable regulation from the IASB.  The focus here has 
been on the overt, publicly visible behaviour of the players, but it is probable that 
covert lobbying has also been vehement.  The contribution of lobbying activity to the 
development of a relationship between the extractive industries and the IASC/IASB is 
unquestionable.  Extractive industries companies and industry groups have been 
active and vigorous lobbyists of the IASC/IASB since the early stages of the 
international accounting standard setting project, contributing to over 60 percent of 
the comment letters in respect of this matter and representing the views of hundreds of 
economically and politically powerful companies.  In terms of financial support, the 
IASC/IASB was shown to benefit substantially from the resources provided to it by 
the companies discussed in this paper, in addition to many other extractive industries 
benefactors not covered here.  Furthermore, the extractive industries contributed to 
the development of the Issues Paper and IFRS itself through representation on the 
Extractive Industries Steering Committee. 
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The “new” international accounting standard, IFRS 6, is in effect reinforcing the 
status quo and simply codifying established industry practice.  Choice in methods of 
accounting is retained, along with a substantial degree of reporting flexibility to the 
preparers of financial reports.  While this situation may be desirable for the preparers 
of the reports, the extractive industries companies, it is contrary to the espoused 
objectives of accounting standards, whose aim is to facilitate the creation of financial 
reports that provide guidance to users when making economic decisions (McBride 
and Carroll, 2005, p.12).   
6. Conclusions 
 
Adopting a critical investigative approach, this research has exposed the connections 
and overlapping interests which were implicated in the process of setting the IFRS for 
the extractive industries.  Using CDA, the social and institutional contexts within 
which the process occurs revealed that the IASC/IASB funding arrangements and due 
process contribute significantly to the influence of powerful industry players.  An 
analysis of the public discourse arising as a result of the due process revealed not only 
what was said in the responses to the Issues Paper, but, more importantly, who it was 
said by and the significance of these respondents in light of their relationship with 
each other, and with the IASC/IASB itself.   
 
The discourse practice element of CDA facilitated this analysis of the relationships 
between players involved in the international accounting standard setting process, 
which was then explained in terms of regulatory capture theory.  An examination of 
the discourse practice, using PwC, Exxon Mobil, and the API, exposed the 
“interactive process of meaning-making” that occurred during the standard setting 
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process.  The due process procedures were not the objective, transparent, and 
representative measures they are claimed to be.  Rather, the due process provided a 
forum within which powerful and self-interested constituents and constituent 
coalitions could contribute to and capture the standard setting process in order to 
secure favourable regulation.  For many constituents, such as the Exxon Mobil 
Corporation and PwC and members of the API, the potential to influence the 
development of the IFRS may have been seen as a return on their investment in the 
IASC/IASB.  The web of overlaps between players arguably resulted in the outcome 
of the international accounting standard setting process: an interim IFRS that codified 
established, and largely unregulated, industry practices.   
 
The focus of this study has been on the IASB, on the development of one accounting 
standard, on the publicly available responses made to one Issues Paper, and on a 
cross-section only of those responses. The authors believe, however, that the 
coalitions exposed by CDA, and explained using regulatory capture theory, indicate 
the possibility of fruitful further study. This could be achieved by widening the focus 
to other extractive industries players, to the public discourse surrounding other issues 
relating to accounting for the extractive industries, to accounting standard setting 
issues in general, or to other accounting matters where there is a visible public 
discourse within an institutional setting. While the attention of this paper has been on 
the issue of whether the full cost or successful efforts method should be used to 
account for pre-production costs, there are other issues relating to the extractive 
industries, for example, accounting for removal and restoration costs, which have not 
received the same public airing.  Further research could also use interviews as a 
means of adding depth and more of an “insider’s” perspective to the findings. 
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The IASC/IASB’s international accounting standard setting process, while 
rhetorically open and transparent, has the potential to be co-opted by powerful interest 
groups.  While it is widely acknowledged that the accounting standard setting process 
is political, this research has provided details of the source, nature and effect of this 
politicisation within the development of an international accounting standard for the 
extractive industries.  
 
 
 30
1. Issue for Critical Investigative Inquiry
3. Regulatory Capture Theory
Capturing the process.                      
Using connections and relationships to secure 
favourable regulation.
Figure 1. Applying Critical Discourse Analysis and Regulatory 
Capture to international standard setting for the extractive 
industries
Why did IFRS 6 result in a maintenance of the 
status quo?
2. Critical Discourse Analysis
Public discourse
Having a say…
Big 4, companies, 
lobby groups
Social practice
Providing a context…
IASC, due process, funding 
arrangements
Discourse practice
Making connections...
Creating meanings...
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Company name and principal activity Location
Funding to 
IASC/IASB
Mining companies
Anglo American Platinum Corporation Limited South Africa Yes
Anglo American plc UK Yes
Anglo Gold Limited South Africa Yes
Balfour Holding Inc USA No
BHP Billiton Australia Yes
Gold Fields Limited South Africa Yes
Goldfields Limited Australia Yes
Normandy Mining Limited Australia No
Rio Tinto UK Yes
Sasol Mining Limited South Africa No
Mining Industry Lobby Groups*
Australian Gold Council Australia No
Australiasian Joint Ore Reserves Committee Australia No
Minerals Council of Australia Australia No
South African Chamber of Mines South Africa No
Group of 100 Australia No
Petroleum companies
Conoco Inc USA Yes
Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI) Italy Yes
Enterprise Oil plc UK No
Esso Imperial Oil Canada Yes
Exxon Mobil Corporation USA Yes
John S Herold Inc USA No
Kerr-McGee North Sea Limited UK No
Melrose Resources plc UK No
Paladin Resources plc UK No
PetroChina Company Limited China Yes
RWE - DEA AG Germany Yes
RWE AG Germany Yes
RWE Rheinbraun AG Germany Yes
Woodside Petroleum Limited Australia No
Petroleum Industry Lobby Groups*
American Petroleum Institute USA No
Oil Industry Accounting Association UK No
Big 4
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International International Yes
KPMG International Yes
PricewaterhouseCoopers Australia Yes
PricewaterhouseCoopers South Africa Yes
Professional accounting and standard setting organisations
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants UK No
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants Canada No
FACPCE Argentina No
Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens Europe No
Föreningen Auktoriserade Revisorer Sweden No
Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer Germany No
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia Australia No
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales UK No
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan Pakistan No
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Zimbabwe Zimbabwe No
Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants Japan No
South African Institute of Chartered Accountants South Africa No
International Valuations Standards Committee UK No
Others
Dr Geoff Frost/Ms Martine Hardy Australia No
Professor Terry Heazlewood Australia No
Kenneth Arne Kazakstan No
* While there is no information to indicate that these industry lobby groups provided 
direct financial support to the IASC/IASB, individual members were benefactors 
of the IASC/IASB making these coalitions important sources of financial support.
Table 1: Respondents to the Issues Paper
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ACCOUNTING FIRMS ($1,500,000 p.a.) Grupo Santander Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Corp General Insurance Association of Japan
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Hamamatsu Photonics K.K. Nippon Yusen Kaisha Japan Securities Dealers Association
Ernst & Young Hankyu Corporation Nisshin Seifun Group Inc. Japanese Institute of Certified Public
KPMG Hanwa Co., Ltd. Nitto Denko Corporation Accountants
PricewaterhouseCoopers Haseko Corporation Obayashi Corporation Life Insurance Association of Japan
CORPORATE & OTHER Heineken Oji Paper Co., Ltd. Security Analysts Association of Japan
PRIVATE SECTOR SUPPORTERS Henkel KGaA Oki Electric Industry Co., Ltd. Tokyo Bankers Association
ABN Amro Hirose Electric Co., Ltd. Opera Construction Trust Companies Association of Japan
Accor2 Hitachi Cable, Ltd. ORIX Corporation CENTRAL BANKS, GOVT 
Aegon Group N.V. Hitachi Capital Corporation Orpar ENTITIES & OTHER ORGS
Air France- KLM Hitachi High-Technologies Corporation Osaka Securities Exchange Co., Ltd. Accounting Standards Review Board 
Air Liquide Hitachi Maxell, Ltd. Pernod Ricard (New Zealand)
Air Water Inc. Hitachi Medical Corporation Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. Banca d’Italia4
Aisin Seiki Co., Ltd. Hitachi Metals, Ltd. Pfizer Banco de Mexico
Alcatel Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd. Pioneer Corporation Bank for International Settlements
Allianz AG3 Hitachi Transport System, Ltd. PPR Bank Negara Malaysia
Alps Electric Co., Ltd. Hitachi, Ltd. Prudential Financial, Inc. Bank of Canada
Alstom Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing Ltd. PSA Peugeot Citroën Bank of Greece
Altana AG HypoVereinsbank AG Publicis Groupe SA Bank of Japan
American International Group, Inc. Imerys Renault Bank of Korea
Arcelor Infosys Renesas Technology Corp. Board of Governors of the Federal 
Asahi Breweries, Ltd. ING Group N.V. Rengo Co., Ltd. Reserve System (US)
AstraZeneca PLC Inpex Holdings Inc. Rio Tinto London Ltd Central Bank of Ireland
AXA Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co., Royal Bank of Canada Central Bank of the Russian Federation
Azsa & Co. Ltd. Royal DSM European Central Bank
Banco Bradesco S/A Itochu Corporation Rubis Financial Reporting Council of Australia5
Banco Itaú S/A Itochu Enex Co., Ltd. RWE AG Hong Kong Monetary Authority
Bank of America Corporation Itochu Techno-Solutions Corporation Safran International Bank for Reconstruction &
Banque de la Réunion J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Saint-Gobain Development (The World Bank)
BASF AG Japan Telecom Co., Ltd. Sanki Engineering Co., Ltd. International Monetary Fund
Bayer AG JC Decaux SA Sanlam Ltd. Monetary Authority of Singapore
Bayerische Motorenwerke AG JGC Corporation Sanofi-Aventis Ministry of Finance, People’s Republic
BDO International N.V. JS Group Corporation SAP AG of China
Bear Stearns & Co Jtekt Corporation Schneider Electric National Bank of Hungary
BNP Paribas Kaga Electronics Co., Ltd. Seiko Corporation National Bank of Slovakia
Boeing Company Kajima Corporation Seiko Epson Corporation Office of the Superintendent of Financial
Bouygues Kanto Auto Works, Ltd. Sharp Corporation Institutions of Canada4
BP plc Kao Corporation Shell International Reserve Bank of Australia
BT Katokichi Co., Ltd. Shimizu Corporation Reserve Bank of India
Bull Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha,Ltd. Shin Nihon & Co. South African Reserve Bank
Calbee Foods Co., Ltd. Keihan Electric Railway Co., Ltd. Siemens AG Swiss National Bank
Canon Inc. Kintetsu Corporation Société Générale
Canon Marketing Japan Inc. Komatsu Ltd. Sony Corporation
Cap Gemini Ernst & Young Kumagai Gumi Co., Ltd. Standard & Poor’s
Capital Research and Management KYB Corporation State Farm Insurance Companies
Carrefour Lafarge Suez
Casio Computer Co., Ltd. Lagardere Sumitomo Bakelite Co., Ltd.
Cemex S.A. de C.V. Lehman Brothers Inc. Sumitomo Chemical Company, Ltd
Central Japan Railway Company London Stock Exchange plc Sumitomo Corporation
Cesar L’Oreal Sumitomo Electric Industries, Ltd.
Ciments Français LVMH Swiss Reinsurance Company
Citigroup, Inc. M6 – Metropole Television Taisei Corporation
Citizen Watch Co., Ltd. Marubeni Corporation Taiyo Nippon Sanso Corporation
CNP Assurances Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. Teijin Limited
Commerzbank AG Mazars Telefonica S/A
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) Mazda Motor Corporation Telekomunikacja Polska S.A.
Crédit Agricole SA Meiji Seika Kaisha, Ltd. The Furukawa Electric Co., Ltd.
DaimlerChrysler Meitec Corporation Thales
Denso Corporation Merrill Lynch TIAA-CREF
Dentsu Inc. Michelin Tohmatsu & Co.
Deutsche Bank AG Microsoft Corporation Tokai Rubber Industries, Ltd.
Deutsche Bundesbank Misuzu Audit Corporation Tokuyama Corporation
Deutsche Post Mitsubishi Corporation Tokyo Stock Exchange, Inc.
Deutsche Telekom AG Mitsubishi Electric Corporation Toppan Printing Co., Ltd
Dexia Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. Toyota Boshoku Corporation
Dresdner Bank AG Mitsui & Co., Ltd. Toyota Industries Corporation
E.ON AG Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. Toyota Motor Corporation
EADS Mitsui Sugar Co., Ltd. Toyota Tsusho Corporation
EDF SA Moody’s Foundation UBS AG
Euler Hermes Morgan Stanley Ushio Inc.
Euronext N.V. Münchener Rückversicherungs-Gesellschaft Valeo
Familymart Co., Ltd. Nankai Electric Railway Co., Ltd. Vallourec
Fimalac NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc. Veolia Environnement
Fitch Ratings Natexis Banques Populaires Vinci
Fortis SA-NV NEC Corporation Vivendi Universal
France Telecom Nestlé SA Vneshtorgbank
Fuji Television Network, Incorporated New York Stock Exchange Vodafone Group Services Limited
Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd. Nexans Wendel Investissement
Fujitsu Limited Nichias Corporation Yazaki Corporation
Gaz de France Nippon Oil Corporation Yodogawa Steel Works,Ltd.
General Electric Company Nippon Paint Co., Ltd. ASSOCIATIONS
GlaxoSmithKline Nippon Paper Group, Inc. Associazione Bancaria Italiana (ABI)6
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Nippon Paper Industries Co., Ltd. CFA Institute
Grant Thornton Nippon Shokubai Co., Ltd Emittenti Titoli S.p.A.7
Groupe Danone Nippon Steel Corporation Financial Executives International
5 The Australian Financial Reporting 
Council made its contribution on behalf of 
private and public sector stakeholders in 
the Australia accounting standard-setters 
6 Contribution made on behalf of the Italian 
banking community.
7 Contribution made on behalf of the Italian 
business community.
Appendix 1: IASB Financial Supporters for 20061
1 Total of 283 financial supporters, 
including 124 Japanese donors paying 
through the Japanese Council for Better 
Corporate Citizenship, of which six 
organisations are not listed because they 
2 All contributions from French companies 
and associations were channeled through 
Association pour la participation des 
enterprises françaises à l’harmonisation 
comptable internationale (ACTEO).
3 All contributions from German companies 
and associations were channeled through 
the Deutsches Rechnungslegungs 
Standards Committee (DRSC) e.V.
4 Its 2006 contribution arrived after the 
IASC Foundation’s 2006 Financial 
Statements were closed.
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